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Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are expected to strengthen the
public confidence in the correctness of an election outcome. We hypothe-
size that this is not always the case, in part because for large margins
between the winner and the runner-up, the number of ballots to be drawn
can be so small that voters lose confidence. We conduct a user study with
105 participants resident in the US. Our findings confirm the hypothesis,
showing that our study participants felt less confident when they were
told the number of ballots audited for RLAs. We elaborate on our findings
and propose recommendations for future use of RLAs.
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1 Introduction
A credible election does not only produce an election result, it also provides
guarantees that this election result is correct. Depending on the country and
the electoral, these guarantees can take many different forms. In some countries,
votes are counted more than once, for example in Scandinavia. In others, votes
are counted only once and guarantees are given by a post-election audit, triggered
either automatically, or when the margin between winner and runner-up is thin.
One particular post-election audit, a so-called Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA), is
gaining increasing popularity, because it can be extremely efficient especially
if the margins are wide. It will automatically trigger a full recount if enough
statistical evidence is not found to support the election outcome, and it can be
adopted to several electoral systems, including first-past the post [6], d’Hondt
based systems [15], and instant runoff elections [1]. One would expect RLAs to
strengthen public confidence in the election, first, because they can be integrated
into existing election processes, for example, in Denmark, where the result of the
first (rough) count can be verified during the second (fine) count [10]. Second,
some of the ceremonies surrounding RLAs can be turned into public events, such
as the dice-rolling ceremony used to create entropy to select a random sample
(see the public notice of the Colorado Secretary of State [5]).
But do RLAs really strengthen public confidence? Of course, from a statistical
point of view, they do. The theory is sound and the sample size is mathematically
determined once the (diluted) margin and the risk limit are known. And yet,
often, the sample size is ridiculously small, especially when the margins are wide,
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leading us to wonder if voters find those numbers convincing and confidence-
raising. In Denver County, Colorado, USA, where nearly 393,826 votes were cast
during the 2020 election, the RLA that was conducted shortly after the election
required a sample size of 523 votes to achieve a 96% confidence (risk limit 0.04)
that the election result was correct. In Kenya, during the Presidential Election of
October 2017, where 15,593,050 votes were cast, a hypothetical RLA would need
to sample only 166 ballots to achieve a confidence of 99% (risk limit 0.01) in a best
case scenario. To answer the research question if RLAs really strengthen public
confidence in the outcome of an election, we conducted a user study with 105
randomly chosen US residents across all demographics using the Prolific platform.
The participants in this study confirm several hypothesis, such as H1,1 where we
asked the participants about their opinion on the number of ballots to be selected
for auditing, they provided a number higher than the number prescribed by the
RLA methodology and H1,2 where we found that the participants’ confidence in
the audit results changed when they were informed about the number of ballots
selected for auditing. The quantitative and qualitative analysis confirmed both
hypotheses.
In this paper we describe the user study and its results. We give a brief
introduction to RLAs and how they work in Section 2, before we outline the
methodology for this user study in Section 3. We report on results in Section 4
and assess the impact of our findings in Section 5.
2 Background
Post-election audits are a common part of election cycles around the world. They
are designed to inform officials if there has been a problem with electronic voting
or counting machines, they can act as a deterrent against fraud, and overall they
are expected to increase public confidence into the election result.
Trust and public confidence in correct outcomes, a human trait that is
particularly affected by the use of (election) technologies whose inner workings
are neither transparent nor easily understandable, have been studied in general
terms [12] and in terms of Internet Voting [2, 7, 13, 14], where there are no paper
ballots available. If paper ballots (hand-marked or machine-marked) are available,
they can be audited in different post-election audits, which we discuss next.
What constitutes a post election audit differs from country to country. In
some countries, e.g., in Denmark, Germany, Norway, post-election audits are an
integral part of the counting and tabulation process, and executed every time
an election is held. In other countries there are clear rules when a recount is
triggered, (a) if the margin is below 0.5%, (b) at the discretion of the Secretary
of State, or (c) if voters file a petition. In the US, each state has their own local
regulatory framework that defines who decides if a recount takes place, how many
ballots are to be audited, from where these ballots are drawn, and who is going
to pay for the recount. Lastly, there are many countries in the world, especially in
developing and post-conflict countries, where there are no provisions for recounts
at all.
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In 2012, Lindeman and Stark [6], devised a novel statistic-based method for
election auditing, which is called a risk-limiting audit (RLA). The advantages of
an RLA are plentiful. It is the only method that can provide statistically valid
evidence supporting the correctness of an election outcome, and it is also the
only method that can correct an erroneous election outcome. Without going into
details or the different flavors of RLAs that exist, an RLA requires voter verified
paper ballots, i.e. ballots that represent the intent of the voter, and it requires
that the integrity of the paper trail is established and trusted.
An RLA is administered by the following procedure: Given a risk-limit that
defines the likelihood with which the RLA will recognize and correct an erroneous
election outcome, and given the smallest margin between winners and losers, the
RLA then (1) computes the sample size of ballots to be drawn random, where it
has become customary to create the entropy using several 10-sided dice, and (2)
identifies the individual ballots to be drawn. RLAs can be used when ballots are
identifiable, for example in UK elections where ballot papers are numbered or
when ballots are sorted into batches. The actual audit consists of locating the
physical ballots in the random sample, and then checking if they are correctly
interpreted (digitally) or correctly sorted into batches.
RLAs were introduced in 2012 and are now regularly used in different US
states for auditing US presidential, congressional, and local elections. One of
the reasons why RLAs are used predominately in the US, is because ballots
usually contain multiple races, which renders manual counting and tabulation
impossible. Since ballots are digitally interpreted and electronically counted,
RLAs provide a transparent way to ensure that the results are correct. Recent
election observation reports [3, 4] noted a trend towards hand-marked paper
ballots and RLAs. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures [8],
the use of RLAs is in statute for the three states, Colorado, Rhode Island, and
Virginia. The statutory pilot programs are run in Georgia, Indiana, and Nevada
whereas the use of RLAs is optional in California, Ohio, Oregon and Washington.
In contrast, Michigan and New Jersey are running only administrative pilot
programs, similar to the one, we conducted in Denmark [10]. For a detailed
description of risk-limiting audits and its application in other countries, see [11].
Risk-limiting audits are currently considered as the gold standard among
post-election audits because it is statistically sound, verifiable, and reproducible,
given the entropy used for selecting the random sample. However, besides all the
mathematical rigor, there is also a psychological side to an RLA: If the respective
margin between winners and losers is wide, the number of ballots to be audited
is actually really small. For example, in Kenya, the Presidential Election of 2017
reported that Uhuru Kenyatta obtained 8,223,369 votes, whereas his opponent
Raila Odinga obtained 6,822,812 votes, which yields a margin of 1,400,557 votes.
When setting the risk-limit to 1%, the ballot-level comparison RLA reports a
sample size of 166 ballots. For some, considering that 15,593,050 ballots were
cast, drawing only 166 ballots to verify such an important election may sound
unbelievable, untrustworthy, and perhaps even unacceptable.
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3 Methodology
We describe the online survey, including the study hypotheses.
3.1 Study procedure
The study was conducted as an online survey1 and consisted of the following
parts:
General audits The participants were presented with a scenario about a
hypothetical election with the following description:
Consider the following scenario: an election was conducted, with a total
of [NUM VOTERS] voters casting their votes in favour of either candidate
A or candidate B. After the count, candidate A got [MARGIN] votes more
than candidate B, so candidate A was announced as the winner of the
election.
The values of NUM VOTERS and MARGIN were dynamically generated for each
new participant at random, with NUM VOTERS uniformly generated from the range
between 2, 900, 000 and 3, 100, 000, and MARGIN uniformly selected to be in the
range of 0% to 20% of the total vote (that is, modeling elections with two
candidates where the share of votes for a winning candidate is between 50% and
60% of total cast votes)2.After presenting the scenario, the participants were
asked whether they believed that an election audit would be a good idea if the
candidate they supported lost the described election (Likert 5-point scale, from
“definitely not” to “definitely yes”) and were asked to explain their answer.
RLA Afterwards, the participants were presented with the same election scenario
once again. This time, they were being told that the election officials are planning
to conduct a risk-limiting audit:
After the election, the (election) authorities decided to conduct an audit
known as a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA). This audit manually reviews a
sample of ballots, to check whether the reported election result is correct.
The number of ballots for this sample is not fixed but depends on the
difference between the votes of the two candidates.
The participants were then asked whether such an audit would strengthen
their confidence in the election result (Likert 5-point scale, from “definitely not”
to “definitely yes”), and how much time they believed it should take for the
election officials to announce the results of the audit. Afterwards, they were asked
1 We used the SoSciSurvey platform (https://soscisurvey.de) for hosting the survey
2 The purpose of dynamically setting these values was to investigate the participants’
answers based on a variety of margins.
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to estimate the minimum number of ballots that should be sampled for such an
audit, providing a number from 0 to NUM VOTERS. Following that question, the
participants were provided with the following description of the audit procedure:
The auditors draw and inspect a random sample of [NUM AUDITED] ballots
and conclude that they are 99% certain that the election outcome is
correct.
The value of NUM AUDITED was dynamically computed based on the values
of NUM VOTERS and MARGIN, following the methodology described in Section 2
to ensure the 99% confidence, which corresponds to a risk limit of 1%. The
participants were asked once again, whether such an audit would improve their
confidence in the election result (Likert 5-point scale, from “definitely not” to
“definitely yes”) and were requested to explain their answer.
Selection criteria In the next part, the participants were presented with a
list of criteria that could have been used for choosing the number of audited
ballots, namely, (a) recommendation by NGOs and international organizations,
(b) existing legislation, (c) methodology described in a scientific paper, openly
available online, (d) court decision, (e) mutual agreement among all the political
parties involved in the election and (f) recommendation by independent experts.
For each of the criteria, the participants were asked how their reliance on it
would affect their confidence in the election results (Likert 7-point scale, from “I
would be much less confident” to “I would be much more confident”) and were
requested to explain their answer. The participants were then asked to provide
other criteria they could think of that might be important to them as free-text
answers.3
Demographics To conclude the survey, the participants were asked about their
demographics, namely, gender, age, education, country of residence, and, if they
are registered as a voter in the US elections, in which state and for which party
they are registered. They were also asked whether they had any further remarks
regarding the survey, and to elaborate as a free-text answer.
3.2 Research questions
The aim of our study was to investigate the voters’ mental models of election
audits, in particular, focusing on the misalignment of the assurances provided
by the RLAs and their perceptions among the potential voters. Specifically, we
investigate whether the number of ballots required to be chosen by the RLA
methodology is considered satisfactory by the voters, formulating the following
main hypotheses for the quantitative evaluation:
3 For the sake of brevity, we omit the analysis of this part and provide it in the extended
version of our paper.
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H1,1 When asked about their opinions about which number of ballots should be
selected for auditing, the participants provide a number higher than the one
prescribed by the RLA methodology.
H1,2 Participants’ confidence in the audit results changes when they are informed
about the number of ballots selected for auditing
In addition to these hypotheses, we consider further aspects that might affect
the voters’ confidence in the election audits. We consider the effects on voters’
confidence in the election audits in cases when the methodology of the audits is
supported by one or more of the selection criteria, that is, entities or processes
presented to the participants in the surveys as criteria for choosing the number
of ballots that should be audited. Finally, given the political landscape of the US
elections, we study whether the party affiliation has an effect on the acceptance
of audits. Thereby resulting in the following additional hypotheses:
H2 There is a difference in the effects on the voters’ confidence in audits,
depending on which selection criteria backs up the chosen number of audited
ballots.
H3,1 Party affiliation has an effect on whether the voter believes that election
audits in general would be a good idea
H3,2 Party affiliation has an effect on whether the voter believes that conducting
RLA would strengthen their confidence in the election result before being
told the number of audited ballots
H3,3 Party affiliation has an effect on whether the voter believes that conducting
RLA would strengthen their confidence in the election result after being told
the number of audited ballots
In addition to this, we do a qualitative evaluation of open-ended answers to
understand the attitudes towards election audits.
3.3 Recruitment and ethical considerations
The survey was conducted in March 2021, and the participants for the study were
recruited using the Prolific platform4. The recruitment was done in two stages:
(1) in the pilot stage, five participants were recruited to verify that there were no
significant issues with the survey, and (2) in the full study stage, 100 additional
participants were recruited. As the pilot stage did not reveal any issues, the
survey was not changed and the five participants from that stage were included
in the overall evaluation. As we wanted to study the attitudes in the context of
the US election, only participants with USA as their country of residence were
allowed to participate in the survey. The survey was estimated to take 10 minutes,
and participants were paid 1.25 GBP for their participation, which corresponds
to the recommended reimbursement by the Prolific platform.
Prior to starting the survey, the participants were presented with a consent
form, outlining the goals of the survey, stating that the survey will not collect
4 https://prolific.co
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any personally identifiable data and the anonymized results will be published in
scientific reports. The participants were furthermore told that they can withdraw
from the survey at any time without explanation, however, in that case they
would not be able to get the reimbursement for their participation.
4 Results
A total of 105 participants completed the survey, of them 46 women, 57 men,
one non-binary person, and one participant who preferred not to report their
gender. The majority of the participants reported having either a Bachelor
(44 participants) or a Master (22 participants) degree. The most commonly
represented age group was 30-34 years (24 respondents), followed by 25-29
(20 participants) and 35-39 (16 participants). Almost a half (50 participants)
reported being registered Democrats, 23 were registered as Republican and 21 as
Independent, the rest of the participants chose not to report their party affiliation.
4.1 Quantitative evaluation
We report on the results of evaluating the hypotheses defined in Section 3.2, as
well as provide other descriptive statistics from the study. The p-values for all
the hypotheses H1,1, H1,2, H2, H3,1, H3,2, H3,3, H3,4 are adjusted for multiple
comparison using the Bonferonni-Holm method. We report the adjusted values.
Note, that we report on some statistical tests not included in our hypotheses
outlined in Section 3.2, but nonetheless performed to get a better understanding
of our sample; these are not included in the p-value adjustment. All the sta-
tistical analysis computations are performed using R packages “rstatix”, “coin”
and “PMCMR”. We did not exclude any participants from the evaluation of
the hypothesis H1,2 and H2, and excluded participants who did not provide
a meaningful answer to the question that was critical for the evaluation from
the analysis of the hypothesis H1,1, H3,1, H3,2, H3,3 which we describe in more
details below.
Number of audited ballots
Preferred vs. actual number of audited ballots For the comparison between the
preferred number of audited ballots and the actual number (derived according to
the RLA methodology) presented to the participants after they expressed their
preference, we only considered participants who, when asked about the number
of ballots that they believed should be audited, reported a number larger than 0
(thus excluding participants who either skipped the question or possibly believed
that the RLA should not be conducted at all). After excluding 18 participants
who did not answer that question and 4 additional participants who input 0 as
their answer, 83 participants were included in the evaluation.
When asked which number of ballots the participants would prefer to get
audited, this number tended to be magnitudes higher than the actual number
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required by the RLAs for most of the participants (see Figure 1). While the actual
audited number of ballots presented to the participants ranged from .0016% to
.08% out of total cast ballots (that is, from 51 to 2372 ballots respectively)5,
only 6% of participants (5 out of 83) reported preferring a number of ballot less
than or equal to the actual number required by the RLA methodology. Overall,
the median preferred number of ballots was 6.9%, and the standard deviation
was 36.3% of total number of ballots, indicating not only that participants
overestimated the number of ballots required for audits, but also that they had
highly varying opinions on what this number should be. The majority of the
participants (57%, 48 out of 83) preferred to audit less than 10% of the total
cast ballots, while 21% (18 out of 83) preferred for more than half of the total
cast ballots to be audited, and of them, the majority (12 participants, 14% of 83)
reported preferring a full recount.
The sign test6 has confirmed that the difference between preferred and actual
number of ballots is significantly different from zero (p < .001, 95% CI for median
difference between preferred and actual ballots (as percentage of total ballots) is
[3.23%, 16.1%]), thus, H1,1 is confirmed.
Fig. 1: Preferred (as answered by participants) and actual audited ballots (as
percentage of total ballots) depending on the margin. The scale is logarithmic.
5 Note that the participants had similar number of total ballots presented to them,
namely, ranging from 2.9m to 3.1m, and with the margin between 0 and 20% of the
total number of ballots.
6 The test was chosen due to non-symmetrical distribution of the underlying data.
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Changes in confidence in RLAs While the majority of the participants (70%, 74
out of 105) had a positive attitude towards conducting RLAs, choosing either
“maybe yes” or “definitely yes” as the answer to the question whether their
confidence in the election result would increase based on the audits, only 44%
provided a positive answer to the same question asked after presenting the
number of audited ballots to the participants. Consequently, while only 17% of
the participants (18 out of 105) provided a negative answer (either “maybe no”
or “definitely not”) before seeing the number of audited ballots, this percentage
increased to 45% (47 out of 105) after the participants were presented with that
number. Overall, the majority of the participants (54%, 57 out of 105), were less
likely to think that RLAs would increase their confidence in the election results
when they were told the number of audited ballots (median decrease of 1 point on
the 5-point scale). Furthermore, for 33% of the participants (35 out of 105), being
told the number of ballots led to changing their attitude towards RLAs from
positive (answering either “maybe yes” or “definitely yes” when asked whether
RLAs would increase their confidence in the election result) to negative (choosing
the answers “maybe no” or “definitely not”). Figure 2 shows the distribution of
changes of participants’ answers.
Fig. 2: Percentage of participants choosing each of the combinations of their
answers on whether RLAs would strengthen their confidence in the election result
before and after seeing the number of audited ballots.
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows a significant difference between the
“before” and “after” answers (p < .001, Z = −4.47, effect size r = .33, moderate),
thus, H1,2 is confirmed. Furthermore, Spearman’s test did not show significant
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correlation between confidence change (as the difference between the “before”
and “after” answers) and either the number of audited ballots (p = .1863, r = .13)
or the margin (p = .185, r = −.13).
Selection criteria For all of the selection criteria for the number of audited
ballots outlined in Section 3, namely, recommendation by NGOs and interna-
tional organizations (“NGO”), existing legislation (“legislation”), methodology
described in a scientific paper, openly available online (“paper”), court decision
(“court”), mutual agreement among all the political parties involved in the elec-
tion (“agreement”) and recommendation by independent experts (“expert”), most
of the participants reported that their confidence would either improve or stay
the same. Namely, the median score for the selection criteria “paper”, “expert”
and “agreement” was 4, meaning that the majority of the participants answered
that they would feel either “much more confident” or “more confident” – if the
number of audited ballots was chosen according to these criteria. For the rest of
the selection criteria, the median value was 3, meaning that the majority of the
participants selected one of the options “much more confident”, “confident” or
“my confidence would not change”. At the same time, the number of participants
that answered that they would feel either “less confident” or “much less confident”
if the number of audited ballots was based on specific selection criteria ranged
from 5.7% (6 out of 105) for the methodology described in a scientific paper to
12% (13 out of 105) for existing legislation. The summary of the participants’
answers is provided on Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Answers to the question, how choosing the number of audited ballots
based on the following selection criteria would affect the participants’ confidence
in the election result.
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The Friedman test comparing the scores for all the selection criteria resulted
in p < .001, with χ2 = 30.863 and the effect size W = .07 (small). Thus, H2
is confirmed. The post-hoc tests7 show significant differences between “paper”
and “legislation” (p = .0017), “paper” and “NGO” (p = .009) and “paper” and
“court” (p = .03).
Party differences For the evaluation of the effects of political views on attitudes
towards audits and selection criteria, we exclude participants who chose not to
provide their party affiliation (11 participants), resulting in 94 participants for
the evaluation.
Attitudes towards auditing in general While only 34% of all the participants
who specified their party affiliation (32 out of 94) had positive views on audits
in case their candidate lost the election (answering either “definitely yes” or
“mostly yes” to the question whether such an audit would be a good idea), this
number was higher among the participants who reported Republican as their
party affiliation (61%, 14 out of 23) than among Democrats (30%, 15 out of
50) and Independents (14%, 3 out of 21), see also Figure 4. Similarly, only 35%
of Republicans (8 out of 23) provided a negative answer to the same question
(either “definitely not” or “mostly not”), compared to 62% of Democrats (31 out
of 50) and 67% of Independents (14 out of 21). The Kruskal-Wallis test confirms
the significant difference between the groups (p = .015, χ2 = 10.579, effect size
η2 = 0.9, moderate), thus confirming H3,1. The post-hoc tests furthermore
show significant differences between Republicans and both Democrats (p = .014)
and Independents (p = .016).
Attitudes towards RLAs before specifying the number of audited ballots Most of
the respondents across all parties had a positive attitude towards conducting
RLAs in general, choosing the option either “maybe yes” or “definitely yes” when
asked whether conducting such audits would strengthen their confidence in the
election result (66% of Democrats, 33 out of 50; 87% of Republicans, 20 out of 23;
66.7% of Independents, 14 out of 21), with participants who reported Republican
as their party affiliation being the most likely to provide positive results (see
also Figure 4). At the same time, only 9% of Republicans (2 out of 23) and 14%
of Independents (3 out of 21) expressed negative attitudes towards audits in
such a scenario, answering either “maybe no” or “definitely not”, compared to
22% of Democrats (11 out of 50). The Kruskal-Wallis test furthermore shows
significant difference between the groups (p = .04, χ2 = 7.8192, effect size
η2 = .06, moderate), confirming H3,2, and post-hoc tests showing significant
difference between Republicans and Democrats (p = .029).
Attitudes towards RLA after specifying the number of audited ballots Less than
half of the participants reported believing that their confidence in the election
7 The results of post-hoc tests here and in the next subsection are not included in the
p-value adjustment
12 Asmita Dalela, Oksana Kulyk, Carsten Schürmann
Fig. 4: Answers to the question (left to right), whether (a) participants believed
that conducting audits would be a good idea if their candidate lost the election, (b)
conducting risk-limiting audits would increase the participants’ confidence in the
election results before specifying the number of ballots to be audited, (c) whether
conducting risk-limiting audits would increase the participants’ confidence in the
election results (after specifying the number of ballots to be audited.
result would increase after conducting RLAs with the specified number of ballots,
answering either “definitely yes” or “maybe yes”; of them, 50% of Democrats (25
out of 50), 39% of Republicans (9 out of 23) and 36% of Independents (8 out of
21), see also Figure 4. Consequently, a large percentage of participants across
all parties held a negative view, with 36% of Democrats (18 out of 50), 56% of
Republicans (13 out of 23) and 42% of Independents (9 out of 21) answering
either “maybe not” or “definitely not”. Nonetheless, the Kruskal-Wallis tests did
not reveal any significant difference between the groups (p = .15, χ2 = 3.6773),
thus failing to confirm H3,3.
4.2 Qualitative evaluation
We report the results of analyzing the open-ended answers of the survey. The
answers were analyzed by two paper authors using open coding, and the codes
were iteratively discussed until agreement was reached. We report on our findings
in the subsections below. Each of the reported codes was mentioned at least by
two participants. Since the goal of the qualitative evaluation is to understand
the range of possible opinions, we do not report on the number of participants
mentioning each code, instead using quantifiers according to Table 1.
Attitudes towards auditing We describe the codes identified when studying
the open-ended answers of participants regarding their attitudes towards auditing.
Namely, we consider their opinions regarding (1) whether audits at all would
be a good option, (2) whether risk-limiting audits in particular would increase
their confidence, without specifying the number of audited ballots, and whether
risk-limiting audits with a specified number of audited ballots would increase their






Table 1: Quantifiers used in describing the qualitative results, by percentage of
participants mentioning each code.
confidence. For each of the three questions, we group the participants into the
ones who expressed a negative (selecting either option 1 or 2 on the corresponding
5-point Likert scale), neutral (selecting option 3) or positive (selecting either
option 4 or 5) opinion.
Audits in general Among the participants who expressed a negative opinion
(58 participants) towards audits, most mentioned the fact that the margin was
sufficiently wide. Few participants mentioned that given such a margin an audit
is unlikely to change anything, or that fraud or errors of that scale would be very
unlikely. Few participants mentioned negative effects of audits, such as delays in
announcing election results, monetary costs and overall loss of confidence. Few of
the participants mentioned that they trust the election system, or that an audit
is not necessary unless suspicious activity takes place.
Considering the answers from the participants with a neutral opinion (11
participants) towards audits, some mentioned the fact that the audit is needed if
there is inconsistency or fraud in the election process. Few participants liked the
idea of audits but doubted the audit process, by articulating that not enough
information is given to decide need for audit. Few participants expressed that
audits will not be useful as they feel confident that election was free and fair and
need more information to decide the need for an audit.
The participants with positive opinion (36 participants) towards audit, many
remarked that audit is good for reconfirming election results regardless of which
party wins the election. Few participants also emphasized the need of audit by
stating that it will help in checking the errors which occur during the elections
such as flaws in the way the votes are counted and it can provide a check against
irregularities that stood out from past elections. These participants opined that
audits will increase the accuracy of the results. Also, a few participants mentioned
that audits are necessary when the margin is too small to bring confidence in
the election results.
Risk-limiting audits Out of 18 participants with negative attitudes towards
RLAs, some mentioned that they believed the methodology is flawed (e.g. saying
that recounting only a sample of ballots is not enough or expressing doubts
that sampling would be done in a proper way to ensure representative results,
because of either lack of due diligence or malicious intent on behalf of auditing
authorities). Some stated that the margin was wide enough so that no RLAs
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would be necessary. Few answered that they believed RLAs would not change
anything in the election result, or mentioned negative effects of the audits such
as loss of time or confidence in elections.
Among the participants with a neutral opinion (13 participants) towards
RLAs, some mentioned that they need more clarity on the statistical model
behind the number of ballots selected, indicating that since RLA only reviews a
sample of ballots; a possibility of error still exists. Furthermore, some mentioned
that they trust the election results and feel that audit is not necessary as it
will not solve other issues related to voting such as gerrymandering, which are
shady and need fixing. Few participants also opined that audit will reconfirm the
election results but emphasized that it is not necessary to conduct.
For the participants with positive opinion (74 participants), most mentioned
the fact that the RLAs will help in confirming the validity of the election results
and give a feeling that everything was done correctly. Few of them mentioned
that such reassurance of preventing irregularities will help in building the trust in
the election process. On the other hand, few who liked the idea of audit, wanted
more clarity on the statistical model used to determine the random sample and
mentioned that sample size needs to be a true reflection of the electorate.
Risk-limiting audits with specified number of audited ballots Out of 47
participants who expressed a negative opinion towards RLAs when shown the
audited number of ballots, near-all answered that they believed that the audited
number was too small, also comparing it to the margin or the total number of cast
ballots, as well as providing such further explanations as the sampled number
being within margin of error. Few, furthermore, mentioned that they did not
believe the claims of 99% accuracy given the audit, or that they believed that
auditing such a small number does not show a serious effort on behalf of election
authorities. Few participants furthermore stated that they believed that sampling
is not good enough to confirm the election result (as opposed to full recount),
or, on the contrary, that audits would not be necessary at all in the described
scenario.
Among the participants with a neutral opinion (12 participants) towards
RLAs when shown a specified number of audited ballots, most mentioned that
the audited number was too small and felt that it wouldn’t affect their perception
about the validity of the election results in any major way. Few participants
further questioned the need for conducting such audits by emphasizing that since
the margin of certainty is 99% it makes little sense to conduct such audits and
expressed that they would like to see the statistical method used for computing
the audited number of ballots.
For the participants with positive opinion (46 participants), many mentioned
that the audit will reconfirm the election with 99% certainty and will increase
their trust in the election process. A few opined that it will be value-adding if the
audits are inspected by a third party to avoid potential frauds or discrepancies.
Few participants who showed an inclination for audits articulated the need for
sampling a large number of ballots to convince majority of people. On the contrary,
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a few of them were satisfied with the the sample size chosen for the audit and
stated that the RLA is representing a fair sample of ballots to be audited.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
If we consider the quantitative and qualitative analysis in conjunction, a clearer
picture emerges: despite the statistical soundness of the RLA method, human
factors pose additional challenges to building public confidence, which is one of
the objectives of RLAs. In this section, we describe these challenges and offer
methods to respond to them.
Sample sizes. The qualitative part of our study confirmed the hypothesis that
the voters’ expectation of how many ballots to audit exceeds the sample sizes
computed by the RLA algorithm. We could also confirm the hypothesis that when
sharing information about the size of the sample with the voter, the sample-size
affects the voter’s perception of what is an appropriate number of ballots to audit.
We conclude that small sample sizes can cause distrust. Two ways to respond to
this challenge come to mind. First, by auditing more ballots than required one
can better align the sample size more closely to the expectations of the voter,
lowering the risk for creating distrust. Second, by structuring a national RLA
into smaller RLAs to be executed on the jurisdiction or even precinct level, one
implicitly increases the number of ballots to be audited. This is what happened
for the 2020 US Presidential election, albeit not by choice but by law.
Voter education. Our analysis also stresses the importance of voter education.
Most voters are not familiar with the statistical theory behind RLAs and therefore
it is not necessarily the case that an RLA is effective in strengthening public
confidence in the election outcome. To raise the effectiveness of RLAs for trust-
building, targeted efforts should be undertaken to educate the public on how to
read and interpret the data that is the result of an RLA.8
Paper trail integrity. RLAs work under the assumption that the integrity of
the paper trail is intact, which means that the paper trail is properly secured
between vote casting and auditing. A few participants stated unprompted, how
important the integrity of the paper trail actually is. We conclude that using
hand-marked or even machine-marked paper ballots alone are not sufficient to
strengthen public confidence and trust in the election, but additional efforts need
to be undertaken to explain to the voter why the paper trail has integrity.
External factors. We found that there are external factors that could strengthen
the confidence in the correct choice of the sample to be drawn, and these factors
include academic research papers, experts, and consensus among the competing
parties. We leave this as food for thought for election management bodies, who
consider implementing RLAs as part of the election process.
In future work, we propose to conduct additional user studies to investigate
in more depth, the effects of auditing votes on a jurisdictional or even precinct
level on public confidence, and the effect full hand-counts have on public trust.
8 See for example https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/2020_general_
election_risk-limiting_audit
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Paradoxically, we speculate that voters will trust several smaller RLAs more
then one big RLA on the national level. It would also be interesting to study the
effect of choosing larger sample size than the RLA-determined one to strengthen
public confidence in the election outcome. We realize of course, that this more a
political science than a technical research question.
Limitations: Due to our use of crowdsourcing for recruitment of the partici-
pants, our sample might be biased towards participants younger, better-educated
and more likely to be active Internet users than the general population. While
studies show that crowdfunding platforms can provide a sample representative of
this demographic [9], future studies need to be performed to study the perception
of RLAs among the rest of the population.
We considered the ballot comparison method for RLAs, which is one of two
methods commonly used in the US. Future studies will be needed to investigate
whether the other method, which also results in auditing a larger sample of
ballots, is more likely to create trust.
In our study, we did not ask the participants about their prior knowledge
about RLAs or attempted to educate them about the RLA procedure. While such
investigations would be valuable point of future studies (e.g. in designing effective
voter education measures), our aim was to measure the confidence in RLAs and
how it is affected by publishing the number of audited ballots among potential
voters in the US as it is at this point of time, without extra interventions from
our side.
In our study we aimed to variate the number of sampled ballots (as a function
of total number of cast ballots and margin), in order to study the participants’
attitudes given a variety of scenarios. Nonetheless, our variations still ended up
in a relatively small interval of possible sample sizes. As such, very small margins
(< 1%), that would result in a large amount of audited ballots, were seldom
present and very large margins (> 20%) were not present at all. Future works
will address this.
Finally, we presented an abstract and hypothetical election scenario, whereby
trust in election outcome is affected by an overall context. Our findings however
do show that the usage of RLAs alone is not enough to improve trust and might
actually lower it.
6 Conclusion
We are not against RLAs. We do argue that as a measure to create trust, they
are not sufficient by themselves, and additional measures such as voter education
need to be considered. While this study is the first one to investigate this issue,
follow-up work is needed to better understand the factors influencing voter’s
trust and the effectiveness of various ways one can educate voters about RLAs
or raise trust via other measures.
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